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Evidence
by W. Randall Bassett*
Simon A. Rodell**
and Dmitry M. Epstein
I.

INTRODUCTION

The 2013 term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit saw a number of precedential opinions dealing with a wide
variety of evidentiary issues.' Of particular interest to prosecutors and
criminal defense attorneys are two Eleventh Circuit decisions' applying
the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause' and a unanimous United
States Supreme Court decision dealing with the Fifth Amendment's'
right against self-incrimination as applied to psychiatric evidence.5 A
number of published Eleventh Circuit decisions involved non-constitutional issues under the Federal Rules of Evidence, including balancing
probative value against prejudicial effect under Rule 403,6 authentication of audio and video recordings, and admission of hearsay testimony
when the declarant is unavailable under Rule 804.' The 2013 term also

* Partner in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. The Citadel (B.S.,
1989); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1992).
** Associate in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Occidental College
(B.A., 2003); University of Florida, Hough Graduate School of Business (M.B.A., 2008);
University of Florida, Levin College of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2008).
*** Associate in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Emory University
(B.A., 2003); Georgia State University College of Law (J.D., summa cum laude, 2010).
1. For an analysis of evidence law during the prior survey period, see W. Randall
Bassett, Susan M. Clare & Simon A. Rodell, Evidence, Eleventh CircuitSurvey, 64 MERCER

L. REV. 929 (2013).

2. United States v. Charles, 722 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2013); United States v. Curbelo,
726 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2013).
3. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.

4. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
5. Kansas v. Cheever, 134 S. Ct. 596 (2013).
6. FED. R. EvID. 403.
7. FED. R. EVID. 804; see infra Part IV.
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included several illustrative published and unpublished decisions
examining the admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702' and
the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.'
The Eleventh Circuit's two most consequential evidence opinions apply
the Confrontation Clause to out-of-court translations or interpretations
of a criminal defendant's statements and conversations in another
language. In the first case, the Eleventh Circuit held that a defendant's
rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated when a prosecution
witness who did not speak Creole testified to the interpretation of a
defendant's out-of-court statements in Creole.'o In the second case, the
court determined that no Confrontation Clause violation occurred when
the prosecution introduced a translation of the defendant's Spanishlanguage conversation." This Article reconciles these two decisions
and discusses the Eleventh Circuit's other evidence opinions of note from
the 2013 term.
II.

THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

The Sixth Amendment provides that "[in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right .. . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him."" Confrontation Clause challenges typically arise when
the prosecution attempts to introduce hearsay statements at trial.13 In
its seminal 2004 decision in Crawford v. Washington,' the Supreme
Court held that the Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of
"testimonial" hearsay-that is, "[tlestimonial statements of witnesses
absent from trial"-unless "the declarant is unavailable" and the
defendant "has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine" the declarant." Because the Confrontation Clause applies only to hearsay
statements that are "testimonial," many Confrontation Clause decisions
since Crawford have focused on determining whether a statement is
"testimonial."" Relatively few cases, however, concern a dispute about

8. FED. R. EVID. 702.
9. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
10. Charles, 722 F.3d at 1321-22, 1330-31.
11. Curbelo, 726 F.3d at 1276.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
13. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered "to prove the truth of the matter
asserted." FED. R. EvID. 801(c).
14. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
15. Id. at 59.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Ignasiak, 667 F.3d 1217, 1229-32 (11th Cir. 2012)
(concluding that autopsy reports prepared by medical examiners operating under the
auspices of Florida law enforcement were testimonial).
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who the declarant was or what the statement was.17 This year, these
issues came to the forefront in two Eleventh Circuit decisions, both
involving the prosecution's attempt to introduce hearsay statements that
had been interpreted or translated from one language to another."
The first case, United States v. Charles,'9 involved the prosecution of
a Haitian national, Manoucheka Charles, who spoke Creole but not
English. Charles's legal problems began when she arrived at the Miami
airport from Haiti and presented her travel documents to a Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) officer. One of the documents included a Form
1-512, which authorizes foreign nationals to travel in and out of the
United States while in the process of obtaining legal immigration status.
The CBP officer discovered a discrepancy between Charles's 1-512 form
and the information in the database and detained her for questioning.
The interrogating officer did not speak Creole, but used an over-thephone interpreter service to conduct the interview. The phone service
operator interpreted the CBP officer's questions from English to Creole,
and then interpreted Charles's responses from Creole to English.o
Subsequently, Charles was indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1546
(a)2 ' by knowingly using a fraudulently altered travel document. At
trial, the government sought to introduce Charles's statements to the
CBP officer, but did not call the interpreter to testify.22 Instead, the
government called the interrogating CBP officer, who testified, among
other things, that the interpreter told him that Charles said that "when
she sat down [on the plane], she started reading the [1-512 Form] and
she noticed that the document was illegal because it didn't fit her
profile.""
Appealing her conviction, Charles argued that the CBP officer's
testimony violated her rights under the Confrontation Clause because
she had no opportunity to cross-examine the interpreter."
The
Eleventh Circuit agreed, reasoning that under Crawford, the interpreter

17. See Charles,722 F.3d at 1333 (Marcus, J., concurring specially) ("No Supreme Court
or Eleventh Circuit precedent addresses the question of who the declarant of an interpreted
statement is, at least for purposes of post-CrawfordConfrontation Clause analysis.") (italics
added).
18. Generally, the term "interpretation" refers to oral communications, while the term
"translation" refers to written communications. Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132
S. Ct. 1997, 2005 (2012). We adopt this convention here.
19. 722 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2013).
20. Id. at 1320-21.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (2012).
22. Charles,722 F.3d at 1320-21.
23. Id. at 1321 (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
24. Id. at 1322.
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was "the declarant of the out-of-court testimonial statements" that the
government attempted to admit." More specifically, "Charles [was] the
declarant of her out-of-court Creole language statements and the
language interpreter [was] the declarant of her out-of-court English
language statements."26 The court explained that the interpreter's
statements differed from Charles's statements because language
interpretation does not provide a "one-to-one correspondence between
words or concepts in different languages.""
Rather, "interpreters
render meaning by reproducing the full content of the ideas being
expressed," and they interpret concepts rather than words." The court
explained that "language interpretation necessarily requires the
interpreter .

.

. to understand 'the contextual, pragmatic meaning of

specific language' so that 'much of the information required to determine
the speaker's meaning is not contained in the words of the speaker, but
instead is supplied by the listener."' 29 Because the interpreter was the
declarant, and because the interpreter's statements were "testimonial"
within the meaning of Crawford, Charles had the right to confront
her.ao
The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that "a witness's testimony of an
interpreter's out-of-court statements of what the defendant said" are
admissible under the hearsay rules of the Federal Rules of Evidence."'
The court, however, was careful to distinguish the admissibility of
statements under the hearsay rules versus the Confrontation Clause.3 2
The court explained that, "[elven though an interpreter's statements may

25. Id. at 1323.
26. Id. at 1324.
27. Id. (quoting Frequently Asked Questions about Court and Legal Interpretingand
Translating,NAT'L AsS'N OF JUDICIARY INTERPRETERS AND TRANSLATORS, http://www.nq
jit.org/certification/faq.php#techniques) [hereinafter FrequentlyAsked Questions] (internal
quotation marks omitted).
28. Id. (quoting FrequentlyAsked Questions,supra note 27) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
29. Id. at 1324-25 (quoting Muneer I. Ahmad, InterpretingCommunities: Lawyering
Across Language Difference, 54 UCLA L. REV. 999, 1036 (2007)).
30. Id. at 1323-25.
31. Id. at 1326 (discussing United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 859-60 (11th Cir.
1985) and United States v. Da Silva, 725 F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1983)). According to Rule 801,
a statement is not hearsay if it is offered "against an opposing party" and "was made by
a person whom the party authorized to make a statement on the subject" or "was made by
the party's agent or employee on a matter within the scope of that relationship and while
it existed." FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(C)-(D). In Alvarez, the Eleventh Circuit relied on a
Second Circuit decision to hold that statements translated by a law-enforcement agent did
not constitute inadmissible hearsay, as the translator was the "agent" of the defendant.
Alvarez, 755 F.2d at 859-60 (citing Da Silva, 725 F.2d at 831-32).
32. Charles, 722 F.3d at 1327.
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be perceived as reliable and thus admissible under the hearsay rules,"
the Supreme Court in Crawford "rejected reliability as too narrow a test
for protecting against Confrontation Clause violations."" Rather, as
stated in Crawford,the Confrontation Clause commands that "reliability
be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of crossexamination." And, since Crawford, the Supreme Court "has emphatically reiterated its rejection of a reliability standard, which may be
sufficient under the rules of evidence, but does not satisfy the Confrontation Clause."" Simply put, "not even the highest degree of reliability
of a testimonial statement will satisfy the Confrontation Clause."36
Therefore, in this case, the reliability of the interpreter's statements was
of no consequence for purposes of the Confrontation Clause analysis.3
Less than a month after deciding Charles, the Eleventh Circuit
decided United States v. Curbelo," which dealt with a Confrontation
Clause issue in the context of a written translation." In Curbelo, the
defendant was indicted on drug conspiracy charges related to a large
marijuana-growing operation. At trial, the government played recordings of wiretapped telephone conversations, conducted in Spanish,
between the defendant and several co-conspirators. The government
gave the jury English-language transcripts of those conversations, but
did not identify who prepared the transcripts. Instead, one of the
defendant's co-conspirators, Jose Diaz, testified to the transcripts'
accuracy. The defendant objected to the admission of the translations

33. Id.
34. Id. at 1328 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61).
35. Id. (citing Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2715 (2011) and Melendez
-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 319 n.6 (2009)). Bullcoming and Melendez-Diaz
involved the admissibility of testimony concerning forensic analysis.
36. Charles, 722 F.3d at 1329 n.13; see also id. at 1330 ("The Supreme Court could not
have been clearer that reliability, absent cross-examination, is irrelevant for purposes of
the Confrontation Clause.").
37. See id. at 1330. Interestingly, having determined after a lengthy discussion that
the admission of the CBP officer's testimony violated Charles's Confrontation Clause rights,
the Eleventh Circuit denied relief and affirmed her conviction. Id. at 1330-32. Charles
failed to preserve the issue for appeal, and the Court concluded that the constitutional
violation did not amount to plain error because there was "no binding circuit precedent
(prior to [the] decision here) or Supreme Court precedent clearly articulating that the
declarant of the statements testified to by the CBP officer is the language interpreter." Id.
at 1331. Judge Stanley Marcus issued a special concurrence agreeing with the outcome but
disagreeing with the majority's decision to rule on the Confrontation Clause issue rather
than immediately affirming the conviction on the "plain" prong of the plain-error test. Id.
at 1333-34 (Marcus, J., concurring specially).
38. 726 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2013).
39. Id. at 1265.

950

[Vol. 65

MERCER LAW REVIEW

as hearsay and a violation of his Confrontation Clause rights, but the
district court overruled his objections.'
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit first determined that the translated
statements were not testimonial because they reflected wiretapped
conversations between co-conspirators who "had no reason to believe
their conversations 'would be available for use at a later trial."'4
Moreover, the unidentified translator did not confirm the accuracy of the
transcripts. The court acknowledged that "[ilf the translator had ...
certified that 'the above English-language transcript is a true and
accurate translation of the conversations recorded'

. . .,

we would be

faced with an obvious testimonial statement.', 3
The Eleventh Circuit then addressed whether the transcripts
themselves could be hearsay statements for Confrontation Clause
purposes." Answering this question in the affirmative, the court
reasoned that although the transcripts "did not contain any express
'assertions' by the translator that could be true or false," the transcripts
did contain an implicit assertion "that the translation was accurate.""
In other words, by creating the transcripts, the translator "represented
that each English word, phrase, or concept corresponded to the original
Spanish word, phrase, or concept."46 This implicit assertion of accuracy
qualified as hearsay for purposes of the Confrontation Clause.4 '
The Eleventh Circuit next concluded that the translator's implicit
hearsay statement was testimonial, explaining, "We do not know when
or why the translator prepared the transcripts, but we would assume he
or she did so with an eye toward trial." The court also noted that the
government conceded that the statement was testimonial. 9
Given that the translator's implicit assertion of accuracy was
testimonial hearsay, and the translator was not available for crossexamination, did the transcripts' admission violate the Confrontation
Clause? The Eleventh Circuit held that it did not."o The court

40. Id.
41. Id. at 1272 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52).
42. Id.
43. Id. The Eleventh Circuit noted that one of the co-conspirator's statements in the
transcripts would be admissible in any event because he appeared for cross-examination
at trial. Id. at 1272 n.7.
44. Id. at 1272.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1272-73.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1273-74.
49. Id. at 1274.
50. Id.
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reasoned, essentially, that the implicit hearsay assertion by the
unidentified translator was superseded by the express assertion of Diaz,
a testifying declarant subject to cross-examination. 5'
The Eleventh Circuit explained that the transcript could be testimonial only to the extent it reflected "the translator's statement (implicit
here) that the English translation accurately reflectled] the Spanish
conversation. 5 2 Also, Diaz testified that the transcript was accurate
based on his independent review of the recordings and transcripts."
In fact, the court stated "the anonymous translator's implicit statement
was never admitted at trial," and "[tihe only statement the jury heard
regarding the transcripts' accuracy came from Diaz."' Therefore, "even
if the translator made a testimonial statement out of court, he or she did
not become a 'witness against' the Defendant."
The Eleventh Circuit further explained that its conclusion fully
comported with the recent United States Supreme Court decisions in
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts5 6 and Bullcoming v. New Mexico."
Although the translator, not Diaz, created the transcripts, "Diaz testified
to his own judgment that the transcripts were accurate, not to the
Diaz testified that he "had listened to the
translator's judgment."
recordings, reviewed the transcripts, and believed the transcripts to be
accurate reflections of the recordings." 9 The Eleventh Circuit reiterated that "Diaz's live testimony was the only statement introduced to
support the transcript's accuracy," and that his testimony "was based on
firsthand comparison of the recordings and the transcripts."o
51. See id. at 1274-75.
52. Id. at 1274.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. The court's statement that the translator's implicit assertion "was never
admitted at trial" is somewhat puzzling. Given that the transcripts were admitted into
evidence, it necessarily follows, as the court seemed to suggest earlier, that the translator's
implicit assertion of accuracy was also admitted, albeit implicitly. What the court likely
meant to say was that Diaz's express assertion of accuracy wholly superseded the
translator's implicit assertion of accuracy. After all, the court's opinion strongly suggests
that, absent Diaz's testimony, there would be a Confrontation Clause violation, and there
could be no such violation if the implicit statement was never admitted in the first place.
56. 557 U.S. 305, 310-11 (2009) (holding that if the government seeks to introduce a
drug analyst's certification that a substance contained illegal drugs, the analyst must be
available for cross-examination to avoid a Confrontation Clause violation).
57. 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (holding that the government could not avoid a Confrontation
Clause violation by introducing a blood-test report through the testimony of an expert who
did not conduct the test or observe the test results); see also Curbelo, 726 F.3d at 1273.
58. Curbelo, 726 F.3d at 1274.
59. Id. at 1275.
60. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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The Eleventh Circuit also emphasized (as it did in Charles) that
reliability of the testimony was not at issue.6 ' The question of reliability was "wholly independent" from the Confrontation Clause, which
"makes no distinction between accurate and inaccurate testimony."62
The Confrontation Clause "only insists that testimony be subject to
cross-examination."6 3 The Eleventh Circuit explained that nothing
prevented the defendant from "vigorously cross-examining [Diaz]
regarding his language expertise, his biases, and the translation's
accuracy," and that the defendant could have done no more "if the
original translator had taken the stand."" The court added that Diaz
was actually "a party to the transcribed conversations, meaning he was
in a better position than anyone else to know what was actually said
(and meant) in the conversations."'
Lastly, the Eleventh Circuit expressly distinguished Charles, stating
that the case differed from Charles in "one important respect. '66
The CBP officer in Charles testified to out-of-court statements made by
the interpreter. Here, by contrast, Diaz never even mentioned the
anonymous translator. Rather, he testified regarding his own assessment that the transcripts were accurate translations.... [Blecause
Diaz, not the original translator, was the "witness] against" Defendant
... the admission of the transcripts through Diaz's testimony did not
violate the Confrontation Clause.67

Charles and Curbelo together stand for a rather simple proposition:
under the Confrontation Clause, an interpretation or translation of an
out-of-court statement generally cannot be introduced against a
defendant unless the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine
either (1) the original interpreter or translator of the statement, or (2)
a person who testifies, based on firsthand knowledge, to the accuracy of
the interpretation or translation.
In at least one respect, however, Charles and Curbelo are not entirely
consistent. According to Charles, the interpreter is the declarant of the
explicit, substantive statements made in the original language.
In
contrast, under Curbelo, the translator is the declarant of an implicit

61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.

64. Id. Arguably, the defendant was able to cross-examine Diaz more vigorously
because he was a co-defendant with more incentive to misrepresent the translation.
65. Id. at 1276 (emphasis omitted).
66. Id.

67. Id. (first alteration in original).
68. See Charles,722 F.3d at 1323-24.
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statement that the translation is accurate, not of the explicit translated
statements themselves. 69 The court in Curbelo appeared to recognize
this inconsistency and attempted to resolve it, noting that Charles "did
not discuss whether the translator's statements were explicit or
implicit."o The court in Curbelo explained that
the only assertions that an interpreter makes relate to [the] process of
transferring meaning. When an interpreter or translator renders the
French "l'etat, c'est moi" into "I am the state," he is not asserting he is
the state, but rather that "I am the state" is an accurate rendering of
what the speaker (or Louis XIV) said. It is this added layer-the
translator or interpreter's implicit assertions about the meaning of
words-that make [s] "the statements of the language interpreter and
[the defendant] . . . not one and the same.""

In this light, Curbelo is actually more favorable to criminal defendants
than Charles. Under Charles, the defendant would often have no
Confrontation Clause right to cross-examine the translator, given that
many translated conversations will not be testimonial, such as conversations between co-conspirators.72 Under Curbelo's approach, however,
most translated statements will automatically include the testimonial
assertion of the translator-declarant that the translation is accurate."
Thus, under Curbelo, a defendant almost always has the right to crossexamine the interpreter or translator, regardless of the content or
context of the translated statements themselves.

69. Curbelo, 726 F.3d at 1272-73.
70. Id. at 1273 n.8. The court in Charles made clear, however, that the interpreter's
testimonial statements consisted of the explicit English-version statements made by the
defendant to the CBP officers. See Charles, 722 F.3d at 1324 ("[The interpreter's English
language statements of what Charles told her in Creole are testimonial and subject to
Crawford's mandate governing the Confrontation Clause." (emphasis added)); see also id.
("[Tihe interpreter made the testimonial statements to the CBP officer, and, accordingly,
is the declarant of the English-language statements that the CBP officer heard and
testified to at trial.").
71. Curbelo, 726 F.3d at 1273 n.8 (quoting Charles, 722 F.3d at 1324) (last alteration
in orignal).
72. See, e.g. id. at 1272.
73. See id. at 1273-74 ("We do not know when or why the translator prepared the
transcripts, but we would assume he or she did so with an eye toward trial.").
74. To illustrate, if the court in Curbelo strictly followed Charles's reasoning, it would
end its analysis after determining that the defendant's original wiretapped conversations
were not testimonial. See id. at 1272.
Before leaving the Confrontation Clause, it is worth noting that the Eleventh Circuit this
year limited the application of the Confrontation Clause in capital sentencing proceedings.
See Muhammad v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 733 F.3d 1065, 1076 (11th Cir. 2013). In
Muhammad, the court reiterated that hearsay is admissible in capital sentencing hearings
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SELF-INCRIMINATION

Under the Fifth Amendment, "[nlo person ...

shall be compelled in

any criminal case to be a witness against himself."" In Kansas v.
Cheever," the United States Supreme Court faced the question of
"whether the Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from introducing evidence from a court-ordered mental evaluation of a criminal
defendant to rebut that defendant's presentation of expert testimony in
support of a defense of voluntary intoxication.""
The defendant in Cheever stood trial for capital murder in Kansas
state court after fatally shooting a police officer during a drug raid."
The defendant presented a voluntary-intoxication defense, and, in
support, offered the expert testimony of a psychiatric pharmacy
specialist, who testified that the defendant's "long-term methamphetamine use had damaged his brain" and that on the morning of the
shooting, the defendant was "acutely intoxicated."79
The prosecution sought to rebut this testimony with the testimony of
an expert who had examined the defendant by court order in a federal
court proceeding involving the same crime.o The defendant objected
on the grounds that this rebuttal testimony would violate his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. The trial court overruled
the defendant's objection and allowed the prosecution's expert to testify.
The jury convicted the defendant and recommended a death sentence,
which the trial court imposed. On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court
acknowledged that under the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Buchanan v. Kentucky,"' the prosecution "may introduce the results of

and a defendant's Confrontation Clause rights "are not violated if the defendant has an
opportunity to rebut the hearsay." Id. at 1076 (citing Chandler v. Moore, 240 F.3d 907, 918
(11th Cir. 2001)). Also, "the right to rebut hearsay at capital sentencing does not include
the right to cross-examine the hearsay declarant." Id. at 1077. Thus, the defendant in
Muhammad had the right to cross-examine an officer who testified to out-of-court
statements of a helicopter pilot, but the defendant did not have the right to cross-examine
the pilot himself. Id.
75. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
76. 134 S. Ct. 596 (2013).
77. Id. at 598.
78. Id. at 599.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 600. The defendant had been prosecuted by federal authorities for the same
crime after the Kansas Supreme Court found the state's death penalty scheme unconstitutional. Id. at 599. The federal case was later dismissed without prejudice, and the United
States Supreme Court restored Kansas's death penalty statute. Id. State authorities then
commenced the instant prosecution. Id.

81. 483 U.S. 402 (1987).
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a court-ordered mental examination for the limited purpose of rebutting
However, the Kansas Supreme Court
a mental-status defense."
the
ground that, in Kansas, "voluntary
on
distinguished Buchanan
The Kansas
disease or defect.'
a
mental
intoxication [was] not
conviction.'
defendant's
the
Supreme Court thus vacated
The United States Supreme Court reversed.' The Court reaffirmed
the Buchananrule, which it framed as follows: "[Wihere a defense expert
who has examined the defendant testifies that the defendant lacked the
requisite mental state to commit an offense, the prosecution may present
The Supreme Court reasoned that
psychiatric evidence in rebuttal."
"[any other rule would undermine the adversarial process, allowing a
defendant to provide the jury, through an expert operating as proxy,
with a one-sided and potentially inaccurate view of his mental state at
the time of the alleged crime." Moreover, the Buchanan rule "harmonizes with the principle that when a defendant chooses to testify in a
criminal case, the Fifth Amendment does not allow him to refuse to
answer related questions on cross-examination."8
The United States Supreme Court rejected the Kansas Supreme
Court's reasoning that voluntary intoxication was not a "mental disease
or defect" under Kansas law." The Court explained that Buchanan's
term "mental status" is broader than "mental disease or defect" and
includes defenses based on the "defendant's mens rea, mental capacity
to commit the crime, or ability to premeditate."o The Buchanan rule
also applies to temporary, as well as permanent, mental conditions.91
The Supreme Court acknowledged that a court-ordered psychiatric
evaluation is admissible only for limited purposes, but it declined to
decide whether the trial court exceeded those limits in this case, as the
Kansas Supreme Court did not address the issue." In the end, the
Court held that "where a defense expert who has examined the
defendant testifies that the defendant lacked the requisite mental state
to commit a crime, the prosecution may offer evidence from a court-

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Cheever, 134 S. Ct. at 600 (citing Buchanan, 483 U.S. at 423-24).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 601.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 602.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 603.
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ordered psychological examination for the limited purpose of rebutting
the defendant's evidence."93
Several months before Cheever, the Eleventh Circuit reached a similar
result. In United States v. Troya," the defendant was charged with a
number of federal capital offenses relating to the murder of a couple and
their two children.95 At the penalty phase of the trial, the defendant
presented the testimony of a mental-health expert who opined that the
defendant's behavior "was affected by community problems, neighborhood problems, and varying academic problems," and that the defendant's childhood involved "family management" issues, including
"domestic violence and lack of familial support."'
In rebuttal, the
government presented the testimony of another expert, Dr. Brannon,
who testified that the defendant "exhibited no signs of early childhood
family 'disturbances,' and that [the defendant] reported a positive
supportive relationship with his family and a 'good' childhood."' The
defendant was sentenced to death for the murder of the two children.9"
On appeal, the defendant argued that the admission of Dr. Brannon's
testimony violated the Fifth Amendment and Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 12.2(cX4)." The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, stating that
nothing in Dr. Brannon's testimony "exceeded the scope of the issues
upon which [the defendant] introduced evidence.""oo The court rejected
the defendant's argument that his experts "only introduced testimony as
to his intellectual functioning and I.Q."'o' Rather, one of the defendant's experts testified to his "lack of prenatal care, a family history of
alcohol abuse and domestic violence, restlessness, antisocial behavior, a
learning disability, living in a 'bad area,' academic failure, and

93. Id.
94. 733 F.3d 1125 (11th Cir. 2013).
95. Id. at 1130.
96. Id. at 1139.
97. Id. at 1140.
98. Id. at 1130.
99. Id. at 1138. Rule 12.2 incorporates the Fifth Amendment's right against selfincrimination and prohibits the admission of a defendant's statements made in the course
of a psychiatric evaluation, as well as expert testimony based on those statements, except
where the defendant himself has introduced evidence of a mental condition. See FED. R.
CRIM. P. 12.2.(c)(4). Notably, the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination applies
in sentencing hearings as well as trials. United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1196
(11th Cir. 2011).
100. Troya, 733 F.3d at 1140.
101. Id.
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concentration problems."102 Thus, the admission of Dr. Brannon's
testimony did not violate the Fifth Amendment or Rule 12.2(c)(4).10
IV. NON-CONSTITUTIONAL EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
Prejudice and CharacterEvidence
In criminal trials, the government will often introduce evidence of
illicit conduct that is not part of the charged offenses. Such evidence is
commonly challenged as being unduly prejudicial under Rule 403 or as
improper character evidence under Rule 404(b). 04 Rule 403 permits
a court to "exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay,
Rule
wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence."'
404(b) provides that evidence "of a crime, wrong, or other act is not
admissible to prove a person's character" to show that he committed the
instant offense in conformity with that character; but such evidence
"may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
Evidence admissible under Rule
mistake, or lack of accident."o'
404(b) must still "be weighed against Rule 403 prejudice."'
This year, the Eleventh Circuit issued a number of published decisions
construing Rules 403 and 404(b). For example, in United States v.
Joseph,' the defendant doctor was convicted for violating the Controlled Substances Acto by improperly prescribing medications."0
On appeal, the defendant argued that the district court violated Rule
403 in admitting a government investigator's testimony that the
defendant's patients "included about 300 known drug offenders.""'
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, stating that this testimony was
probative of the defendant's guilt."' The court explained that "[tihe

A.

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. FED. R. EviD. 403; FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
105. FED. R. EVID. 403. "[The balance under Rule 403 should be struck in favor of
admissibility." United States v. Nelson, 712 F.3d 498, 512 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting United
States v. Eldns, 885 F.2d 775, 784 (11th Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
107. Troya, 733 F.3d at 1131.
108. 709 F.3d 1082 (11th Cir. 2013).
109. U.S.C. tit. 21 (2012).
110. Joseph, 709 F.3d at 1092-93.
111. Id. at 1100 (internal quotation marks omitted).
112. Id. at 1101.
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testimony was relevant to prove that many of [the defendant's] patients
either abused their drugs or sold their drugs and that [the defendant]
either knew or should have known about his patients' misuse of their
prescription drugs.""'
In 1Roya, the Eleventh Circuit held that the defendants' prior acts of
shooting a firearm into a residence "were admissible under Rule 404(b)
to show [their] intent to possess firearms as related to the firearms
charges in the indictment."'1 4 Moreover, the probative value of this
evidence was not outweighed by any undue prejudice because the district
court "explicitly provided the jury with the limiting instruction that it
could not consider the ...

shootings in initially determining whether

[the defendants] had committed any of the charged offenses; rather the
jury had to first conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that they had
committed the offenses from other record evidence."" 6
One other Rule 403 case, though unpublished, merits discussion."'

113. Id. The Eleventh Circuit also held that the investigator's testimony about 300
"known drug offenders" did not constitute an improper summary of the evidence. Id. at
1100 (internal quotations omitted). The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that "Federal Rule of
Evidence 1006 permits parties to present summaries of evidence and requires only that the
proponent of the evidence 'make the originals or duplicates available for examination or
copying, or both, by other parties at a reasonable time and place.'" Id. at 1101 (quoting
FED. R. EvID. 1006). Here, the defendant did not argue that the facts supporting the
investigator's testimony "were not readily available to him." Id.
114. 733 F.3d at 1132. At the same time, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that evidence
of another shooting into a residence and a home invasion did not even come within the
scope of Rule 404(b) because the evidence was inextricably intertwined with the charged
conspiracy. Id. That shooting "was admissible as intrinsic evidence of the charged drug
conspiracy and .. . the attempted home invasion was direct evidence of the charged drug
conspiracy." Id. The court reasoned that the shooting "was done to protect the
[defendants'] extensive drug operation, the conspiracy charged in this case, and thus was
'inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense.'" Id. (quoting
United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1344 (11th Cir. 2007)). As to the home invasion,
it "established the method by which [the defendants] obtained drugs to distribute as part
of the larger drug ring at issue." Id. Furthermore, both the shooting and the attempted
home invasion "occurred within the time frame of the charged crimes." Id.
115. Id.; see also United States v. Smith, 741 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that
in a drug distribution case, the district court did not violate Rule 404(b) by admitting
evidence of the defendant's prior convictions that occurred six to ten years before the
instant offense, and where the prior convictions were for possession of drugs rather than
distribution); Nelson, 712 F.3d at 513 (holding that Rule 403 did not prevent the admission
of testimony regarding a meeting that took place almost a year before the charged
conspiracy, as this testimony "was unquestionably probative as to a number of issues
bearing upon [the defendant's] guilt" and was "not necessarily prejudicial," yielding
inferences potentially favorable to the defendant).
116. Although not binding precedent, unpublished decisions of the Eleventh Circuit can
provide helpful guidance and may be used as persuasive authority. Suntree Techs., Inc.
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In United States v. Patrick,n' as a result of a prison fight, the defendant was charged with aiding and abetting an assault resulting in
serious bodily injury to a fellow inmate. During the fight, the victim
was stabbed to death by another participant, not the defendant. In fact,
the defendant's theory of the case was that he initiated a fistfight with
the victim to get him transferred to solitary confinement, thereby
preventing a planned, racially motivated attack on the victim by other
inmates and preventing a "racial disturbance" in the prison. The
defendant argued that he neither intended nor anticipated the stabbing.118
The government sought to introduce several surveillance videos that
partially depicted the fight.119 However, the district court excluded
these videos as unduly prejudicial under Rule 403 because the "dominant
feature" of the videos was the stabbing motions of the killer, and the
videos "did not clearly capture [the defendant's] actions before, during,
or after the stabbing."l20
The Eleventh Circuit reversed, stating that the videos were "both
relevant and highly probative on a number of issues of consequence,
including whether [the defendant] committed an assault or aided or
abetted in its commission, whether the victim suffered a serious bodily
injury, and whether [the defendant's] actions were a proximate cause of
those injuries.""' Although the defendant conceded that the victim
was stabbed and that the stab wounds qualified as serious injuries, and
although live witnesses could testify about the events, this did not
render the videos irrelevant and did not "negate or significantly detract"
from their probative value.122 Simply put, as long as it could point to
other probative value for the evidence, the government was entitled to
prove its case with evidence of its own choosing, despite the defendant's

stipulations. 123
The Eleventh Circuit further determined that the videos were not
"unfairly prejudicial"; they were "remarkably muted for such a violent
crime," depicting a "soundless, bloodless, largely sanitized version of the
events, with [the victim] off screen during most of the fight, including
the stabbing.""
Also, the videos were not unduly prejudicial just

v. Ecosense Int'l, Inc., 693 F.3d 1338, 1349 n.1 (11th Cir. 2012).
117. 513 F. App'x 882 (11th Cir. 2013).
118. Id.
119. See id. at 884-85.
120. Id. at 885.
121. Id. at 887.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 888.
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because they depicted only a portion of the assault.'25 The court
explained that "[a] video recording of only a portion of the events is not
inherently less admissible than the testimony of a live witness who saw
only part of a crime or a photograph that captures an isolated moment
from a single perspective."' 26 Moreover, while the videos could not be
cross-examined, the defendant could "point out their limitations to the
jury and offer evidence to put what they depict in context."' 27
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that the
videos would mislead or confuse the jury as to his role in the assault.'28 "Evidence is not misleading simply because it does [not]
comport with a defendant's assertions about what happened or what he
should, or should not, be convicted of."' 29 Moreover, the videos were
not a "needless accumulation of evidence about the assault," as Rule 403
"does not preclude the admission of relevant evidence simply because
Thus, because the
other evidence addresses the same issues."'
videos' probative value was "not, by any reasonable estimation,
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice," the district
court abused its discretion in excluding them.''
B.

Authentication
When a party seeks to introduce a video or audio recording into
evidence, the party must show "that the recording is an accurate
reproduction of the conversation recorded."'32 In a criminal case, the
government must authenticate a taped recording by showing "(1) the
competency of the operator; (2) the fidelity of the recording equipment;
(3) the absence of material deletions, additions, or alterations in the
relevant part of the tape; and (4) the identification of the relevant
Nevertheless, where "independent evidence" exists as to
speakers."'
the accuracy of the tape recordings, the Eleventh Circuit is "extremely
reluctant" to reverse the trial court's admission of the evidence, even if,

125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 889.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. United States v. Capers, 708 F.3d 1286, 1305 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting United
States v. Sarro, 742 F.2d 1286, 1292 (11th Cir. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
133. Id. (quoting Sarro, 742 F.2d at 1292).
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at the time of admission, "the government had not carried its particularized burden of going forward."13
The Eleventh Circuit addressed the adequacy of authentication in
United States v. Capers," where the government introduced audio and
video recordings of an alleged drug transaction between the defendant
and a confidential informant (CI). On appeal from his conviction, the
defendant argued that these recordings were inadmissible due to a lack
of proper foundation. 36 The Eleventh Circuit agreed, reasoning that
the government "offered little proof of the fidelity of the recording equipment.""' The only testimony to that effect was from a police officer,
who testified that he gave the recording equipment to the CI before the
drug transaction, recovered it after the transaction, and then gave it to
another officer for conversion to a compact disc.'
"Although the
government offered proof that agents independently observed the
meeting between the CI and [the defendant], thus corroborating the
video portion, neither [the defendant] nor the CI testified about this
transaction and there was no independent testimony to corroborate the
audio of the encounter.""' Thus, the Eleventh Circuit concluded, the
audio portion of the recording was inadmissible. 40 The court affirmed
the defendant's conviction, however, holding that the error in admitting
the recording was harmless.' 4'
C.

When Is a Hearsay Declarant Unavailable?
The Federal Rules of Evidence allow the admission of certain hearsay
statements when the declarant is "unavailable as a witness."142 Such
admissible hearsay statements include statements that are "so contrary
to the declarant's proprietary or pecuniary interest or ha[ve] so great a
tendency to invalidate the declarant's claim against someone else or to

134. Id. (quoting United States v. Biggins, 551 F.2d 64, 67 (5th Cir. 1977)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
135. 708 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2013).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1307.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1307-08.
140. Id. at 1308. In another part of the opinion, the Eleventh Circuit determined that
the district court properly admitted another audio/video recording of a drug transaction.
Id. at 1305-06. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that, for this transaction, an officer testified
that the audio/video equipment was operating properly, that he had an opportunity to
watch the audio/video recording, and that each recording "matched the surveillance that
he observed that day." Id. at 1306 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
141. Id. at 1308.
142. FED. R. EvID. 804(b).

962

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability" against the declarant's
4
interest that the declarant likely believed the statement to be true.' '
A declarant is considered unavailable if, among other things, the
declarant "testifies to not remembering the subject matter."'" In
Lamonica v. Safe Hurricane Shutters, Inc.,"' the Eleventh Circuit
construed the term "subject matter" to mean more than the failure to
remember the particular hearsay statements at issue. 46
In Lamonica, two employees sued their former employer, Safe
Hurricane Shutters, Inc. (SHS) and various company officers, under the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)"' to recover unpaid overtime wages.
One of the plaintiffs' witnesses was Rolando Ibacache, an employee of
SHS who was involved in a related FLSA action against the defendants.'"
While cross-examining Ibacache at trial, the defendants' attorney
asked Ibacache about his alleged statements to the company chief
executive officer (CEO) that the plaintiffs' attorneys "fabricated the
overtime claims." 4 9 Ibacache responded that he did not remember
whether he made such statements to the CEO. Several days later, the
CEO testified at the trial, and the defendants' attorney asked him about
Ibacache's alleged statements. The plaintiffs objected on hearsay
grounds, and the district court sustained the objection and did not
permit the CEO to respond. The plaintiffs prevailed at trial.5 o
On appeal, the defendants argued that the CEO's proposed testimony
about Ibacache's statements was admissible under Rule 804(b)(3) as
statements against Ibacache's interest. The defendants contended that
the declarant, Ibacache, was "unavailable" at trial within the meaning
of Rule 864(aX3) because he testified that he did not remember his
conversation with the CEO.'5 '
The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument, stating that "Rule
804(a)(3) applies only if the declarant is unable to remember the 'subject
matter,' i.e., if 'he has no memory of the events to which his hearsay

143. Id. 804(bX3). Other hearsay statements admissible under Rule 804(b) include: (1)
certain former testimony; (2) statements made under the belief of imminent death; (3)
statements concerning a declarant's personal or family history; and (4) statements offered
against a party that wrongfully caused the declarant to be unavailable. Id. 804(bXl)-(6).
144. FED. R. EVI. 804(aX3).
145. 711 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2013).
146. See id. at 1317.
147. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2012).
148. Lamonica, 711 F.3d at 1315.
149. Id. at 1315-16.
150. Id. at 1305, 1316.
151. Id. at 1317.
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statements relate.' The fact that the witness does not remember making
the statements themselves is irrelevant.""'2 The Eleventh Circuit
explained that the defendants "failed to identify ... any testimony by
Ibacache in which he claimed not to remember the subject matter of his
alleged conversation with [the CEO, namely], whether the overtime
claims were actually fabricated.""' On the contrary, "Ibacache consistently maintained that he and the other installers worked overtime
hours for which they were not compensated."'
V.

EXPERT TESTIMONY

This year, the Eleventh Circuit issued several decisions favorable to
the admission of expert testimony under Rule 702.155 In fact, the
decisions this year suggest a possible trend toward admission of expert
testimony, given the Eleventh Circuit's repeated reversals of the district
courts' exclusion of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard of
review. Under Rule 702 and the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Daubert, the district court bears responsibility for "ensuring that an
expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to
the task at hand."'5 6 After Daubert, the Eleventh Circuit established
the following three requirements for the admission of expert testimony:
(1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters
he intends to address; (2) the methodology by which the expert reaches
his conclusions is sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort of
inquiry mandated in Daubert;and (3) the testimony assists the trier of
fact, through the application of scientific, technical, or specialized
expertise, to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue.'
As in years past, the Eleventh Circuit's 2013 decisions primarily
concerned the second requirement-the reliability of an expert's

152. Id. (quoting N. Miss. Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jones, 792 F.2d 1330, 1336 (5th Cir. 1986)).
153. Id.

154. Id.
155. FED. R. EVID. 702. According to Rule 702, an expert witness may provide opinion
testimony if: (1) the expert's "specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue"; (2) the expert's "testimony is based on
sufficient facts or data"; (3) "the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods"; and (4) "the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts
of the case." Id.
156. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
157. City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th Cir. 1998)
(internal citation omitted).
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Although these decisions are factbound and contain
methodology.'
few broad pronouncements, they are helpful in defining the usually
vague parameters of reliability.
In United Fire & Casualty Co. v. Whirlpool Corp.,1' a products
liability action, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's
exclusion of the plaintiff's expert testimony.16 0 The Whirlpool case
arose from a fire in the home of Robert and Theresa Corral. One night,
shortly before the Corral family went out for dinner, one of the Corral
children put some laundry into the family's Whirlpool dryer and turned
on the dryer. While the family was away, a fire occurred in the home.
Subsequent investigations suggested that the fire originated in the
vicinity of the dryer.'6
United Fire & Casualty Insurance Company (United Fire), as subrogee
for the Corrals, sued Whirlpool for strict products liability and alleged
that the dryer caused the fire.' 62 United Fire retained Raymond Arms,
who was "a professional engineer and certified Fire and Explosives
investigator," to explore the origin of the fire.'
Arms examined the
scene of the fire using a "systemic approach in accordance with the
National Fire Protection Association's 'NFPA 921' guide for fire and
explosion investigations.""' Judging by the burn patterns inside the
utility room and other observations, Arms concluded that the fire
originated with the dryer. Arms then performed a "destructive
examination" of the dryer, during which the appliance was systematically deconstructed and inspected. Based on this examination, Arms
concluded that the fire started when a poorly insulated wire faulted with
the metal exhaust tube, creating an electric current between the wire
and the tube."' This electric current, combined with the flow of air
from the dryer's fan, generated enough heat to ignite the venting on the
outside of the dryer. Arms did not test any exemplars to evaluate his
ignition theory, "could not point to any published studies documenting
this ignition sequence," and had never observed this ignition sequence
before in his professional career.16
Another expert retained by United Fire, Dr. Kendall Clarke, examined
the metal exhaust tube using metallurgic imaging equipment and

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

See Bassett et al., Evidence, supra note 1, at 939, 939 n.70.
704 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 1344.
Id. at 1339-40.
Id.
Id. at 1340.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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discovered that the exhaust tube's microstructure showed signs of
melting. According to Dr. Clarke, such melting would require a
temperature of at least 2,800 degrees combined with a forced draft, and
the only source of such a draft would be the dryer's fan.167
The district court excluded the testimony of both experts "on the basis
that neither expert's testimony was grounded in a reliable methodoloOn appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed, without much
gy."168
discussion, that Arms's proposed testimony regarding the ignition
sequence was properly excluded."' However, the Eleventh Circuit
disagreed with the exclusion of Arms's testimony that the fire originated
from the dryer.7 o This testimony, the court explained, was based on
Arms's investigation of the burn patterns and physical evidence at the
fire scene and his examination of the dryer in accordance with the
industry-standard "NFPA 921" guide."' Simply put, Arms's "testimony regarding the physical origin of the fire was based on a widely
accepted methodology and grounded in the available physical evidence." 172
The Eleventh Circuit also disagreed with the district court's exclusion
of Dr. Clarke's testimony.'7 The "sole purpose" for which Dr. Clarke
was retained "was to examine the metal exhaust tube within the dryer
and estimate the temperature it reached during the fire.""' Even
though Dr. Clarke failed to cite a publication supporting his opinion as
to the melting temperature of the exhaust tube, "reference to a published
study involving dryer ducts is not necessary to demonstrate minimum
scientific reliability."'
The Eleventh Circuit further explained that Dr. Clarke "gave an
extensive explanation of his methodology and explained how his
education assisted him in reaching his conclusions."'
The court
summarized Dr. Clarke's qualifications and methodology and stated that
"[wihile his ultimate conclusions may be contested, it was an abuse of
discretion to conclude that the basic methodology Dr. Clarke applied to
analyze the metal dryer duct lacked minimum scientific reliability." 77

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Id. at 1340-41.
Id. at 1341.
Id.
Id. at 1341-42.
Id. at 1342.
Id. at 1342-43.
Id. at 1342.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1343.
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In a footnote, however, the Eleventh Circuit cautioned: "To the extent
that Dr. Clarke's expert testimony strays from providing an estimate of
the temperature and physical conditions to which the metal exhaust tube
was exposed, the district court should exercise its discretion in limiting
that testimony.""'

In United States v. Alabama Power Co., 7 ' the Eleventh Circuit

again reversed the district court's exclusion of a plaintiff's expert's
proposed testimony.'8o The case stemmed from a decade-long lawsuit by
the U.S. Department of Justice against Alabama Power, in which the
government alleged that Alabama Power violated the Clean Air Act''
by making major modifications at three of its coal-fired power plants
"without obtaining a permit or installing modern pollution control
devices.l 8 2 These modifications enhanced the reliability and power
output of the power plants, which increased the total amount of coal
burned at those plants, and, in turn, increased the emission of pollutants
such as sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide."
To support its case, the government sought to introduce the testimony
of engineers Robert Koppe and Dr. Ranajit Sahu to show that "Alabama
Power should have expected the modifications to significantly increase
pollutant emissions at the plants."'" The combined analysis of Koppe
and Dr. Sahu consisted of two parts. The first part examined how each
modification of the power plant affected the plant's availability and
capacity to produce more electricity. The second part calculated the
pollution increase at each power plant due to enhanced availability and
capacity. The district court excluded the Koppe-Sahu analysis,
reasoning that it was valid only for power plants that operated virtually
continuously at full capacity-also called "baseload" power plants.
Because each of the power plants in question was not a baseload unit,
the Koppe-Sahu methodology did not apply.'
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court abused its
discretion by excluding the Koppe-Sahu analysis.' 6 The court explained that the experts' analysis applied not only to baseload power
plants, but also to "cycling" facilities, which are operated on a regular

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 1343 n.2.
730 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 1288.
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7428.
Ala. Power Co., 730 F.3d at 1280.
Id. at 1280, 1281-82.
Id. at 1280.
Id. at 1282-84.
Id. at 1284.
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basis, but not continuously.'87 The court stated: "Simply because a
model cannot be presumed reliable in a specific context . . . does not
mean that it is per se unreliable in that context."e'8 And in this case,
the government submitted ample evidence to support the Koppe-Sahu
methodology.'
The Eleventh Circuit further explained that even though Koppe's and
Dr. Sahu's analysis might not be persuasive, Daubert did not require an
"all-out exclusion" of their testimony prior to trial. 90 "That the
Koppe-Sahu model always predicts an increase in pollutant emissions
as a result of increased unit availability is not a fatal Daubert flaw ...
but rather a natural outcome of the model's deterministic nature." 9 '
While a district court "may certainly evaluate the mathematical rigor of
a model, the possible existence of a more thorough, more complex model
The Eleventh Circuit thus
is not a basis for wholesale exclusion."'
reversed the grant of summary judgment to Alabama Power.'
In yet another case, Tampa Bay Water v. HDR Engineering,Inc.,19'
the Eleventh Circuit upheld the admission of expert testimony as
sufficiently reliable."' Tampa Bay involved a lawsuit by a municipal
water-supply authority (Tampa Bay) against a private engineering firm
(HDR), alleging a defective design of a water reservoir that had
developed cracks in the embankment. HDR's expert, Dr. Bromwell,
testified at trial that the cracks were caused by the use of improper soil
during construction; the soil became saturated with water, making the
soil cement collapse and crack." Tampa Bay objected to this testimony, arguing that Dr. Bromwell tested the soil using an improper method
that "provided only a single set of data quantifying the volume and
density change in a soil sample that has been subjected to both water
saturation and loading." 97 Tampa Bay argued that Dr. Bromwell
instead should have used a method that "would have measured the
volume and density change due to water saturation alone."'9 The

187. Id. at 1284-85.
188. Id. at 1285.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1288.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. One panel member dissented, stressing the importance of giving deference to
the district court under the abuse of discretion standard of review. Id. at 1288-91.
194. 731 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 2013).
195. Id. at 1174-75.
196. Id. at 1175-76.
197. Id. at 1183.
198. Id. at 1183-84.
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district court permitted Dr. Bromwell to testify over Tampa Bay's
objections, and the jury found in favor of HDR.'99
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's admission
of Dr. Bromwell's testimony.200 Citing an article on soil testing submitted by Tampa Bay, the court concluded that Dr. Bromwell's method,
while "perhaps not ideal," was a recognized soil-testing method "whose
protocol [was] widely accepted in the scientific community."2"' The
court explained that Dr. Bromwell extrapolated the needed data from his
method using "mathematics, not unscientific supposition."202
The Eleventh Circuit made two additional points. First, although
Tampa Bay's expert testified by affidavit that Dr. Bromwell's methods
were unreliable, "this kind of disagreement between experts ordinarily
goes to the credibility of expert testimony, not its admissibility, and is
the province of the jury.""o' Second, the district court did not err in
considering Dr. Bromwell's "impressive credentials" as an indication that
his method was reliable.204 While an expert's qualifications relate
primarily to the first prong of Daubert'sinquiry, "an expert's overwhelming qualifications may bear on the reliability of his proffered testimony
even if they are by no means a guarantor of reliability."2 05
In addition to the foregoing, the Eleventh Circuit discussed the
admissibility of expert testimony in an unpublished criminal case, again
ruling in favor of admission. In United States v. Reddy,"' a radiologist
named Dr. Rajashakher Reddy was charged with multiple counts of wire,
mail, and healthcare fraud for allegedly submitting radiology reports
without independently viewing or analyzing the films. The defense
asserted that Dr. Reddy did view and analyze the films, but that his
work was not adequately reflected in his clinic's electronic record.o
The defense expert, Dr. Benjamin Sacks, had conducted a "peer review"
study (designed by another expert) of a "sampling of images which Dr.

199. Id. at 1174, 1176.
200. Id. at 1188.
201. Id. at 1184.
202. Id. at 1185.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. (quoting Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc. v. Hurel-Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333, 1341
(11th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sands v. Kawasaki Motors
Corp. U.S.A., 513 F. App'x 847, 851-53 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming as reliable expert
testimony regarding an alternative design for a jet ski, where the expert had tested the
alternative design in the water, but did not test whether the alternative design added new
safety hazards).
206. 534 F. App'x 866 (11th Cir. 2013).
207. Id. at 868-69.
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Reddy had purportedly examined and diagnosed" and concluded that Dr.
Reddy's radiology analyses were correct in a vast majority of the images
reviewed.208 The district court excluded Dr. Sacks's testimony on the
ground that the expert who designed the "peer-review" study did not
have sufficient knowledge and experience to do so, and that Dr. Sacks
was not qualified to testify that the random sampling of images he
viewed was statistically proper.20 s
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed.2"o Addressing at length
all three prongs of the Daubert inquiry-qualifications, reliability, and
relevance-the court concluded that: (1) the study design expert
possessed sufficient qualifications in statistics to design the "peerreview" study, and Dr. Sacks did not have to be trained in statistics to
successfully conduct the "peer review"; (2) the "peer-review" methodology
was reliable because the selected review sample was sufficiently random
and, to the extent some of the sample images fell outside the indictment
period, they could have been omitted without excluding the entire study;
and (3) although the "peer-review" study was not determinative of Dr.
Reddy's guilt, it was "highly probative of the central issue in the case as
to whether it was more or less likely that Dr. Reddy did the work [his
clinic] was getting paid to do." 21 1 "[Liegitimate criticisms of the peer
review study could have been" handled through cross-examination, and
"in most cases it is for the jury to consider inadequacies of a study and
weigh the evidence."212

208. Id. at 870, 872.
209. Id. at 870, 873.
210. Id. at 876.
211. Id. at 873-76 (internal quotation marks omitted).
212. Id. at 876 (quoting Rosenfeld v. Oceania Cruises, Inc., 654 F.3d 1190, 1193 (11th
Cir. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). For a 2013 decision affirming the exclusion
of expert testimony, see Cooper v. Marten Transp., Ltd., 539 F. App'x 963 (11th Cir. 2013).
In Cooper, the plaintiffs sued a transport company after a low-speed collision with a tractor
trailer. The plaintiffs sought to introduce the testimony of three experts to show that the
collision caused their subsequent back problems. The district court excluded the proposed
testimony as unreliable under Daubert,and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Id. at 964.
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that one expert's testimony was unreliable because he
did not conduct any testing, but generated his opinion "by learning and thinking about the
[plaintiffs'] case and reaching a conclusion." Id. at 965. Essentially, the plaintiffs were
"asking the district court simply to take the expert's word for it." Id. at 966 (internal
quotation marks omitted). As to the other two experts, they relied solely "on a temporal
relationship" to establish causation, concluding that because the plaintiffs did not manifest
their specific injuries until after the collision, the collision "was the cause of those injuries."
Id. at 967. Such reasoning, the Eleventh Circuit stated, "is a classic 'post hoc ergo propter
hoc' fallacy, which 'assumes causation from temporal sequence.'" Id. (quoting Kilpatrick
v. Breg, Inc., 613 F.3d 1329, 1343 (11th Cir. 2010)).
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Although the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the exclusion of the plaintiffs' expert testimony,
it reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants, explaining
that Georgia law did not necessarily require expert testimony to establish causation. Id.
at 967, 969; see also Broussard v. Maples, 535 F. App'x 825, 826-29 (11th Cir. 2013)
(affirming as unreliable an expert's report that the defendant company's hiring of illegal
immigrants depressed real hourly wages, where (1) the expert used Hispanic schoolenrollment figures as a proxy for a total number of legal and illegal immigrants, which was
a "novel and untested" methodology, and (2) the existing economic scholarship did not show
that immigration impact on wages could be reliably measured at the level of a single firm).

